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Abstract 
 
In a series of papers, William J. Goode (1962; 1970; 1993) argued that the relationship between 
modernization and the class composition of divorce is inverse. Starting from his hypothesis, we 
examine the relationship between female education and the risk of divorce over time in seventeen 
countries. We expect that the relationship differs across countries and across time, so that women 
with higher education have a higher risk of divorce in countries and at times when the social and 
economic costs of divorce are high, and that there is no relationship or a negative relationship 
where these costs are lower. Using discrete-time event-history techniques on data on first marriages 
from the Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS), we find that women with higher education had a 
higher risk of divorce in France, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain. We do not find a relationship 
between education and divorce in Estonia, Finland, West-Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Sweden and 
Switzerland, nor, depending on the model specification, in Flanders and Norway. In Austria, 
Lithuania and the United States the educational gradient of divorce is negative. Furthermore, as 
predicted by our hypotheses, the educational gradient becomes increasingly negative in Flanders, 
Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the USA. We explore this variation 
across time and countries in more detail with multilevel models and direct measures on the legal, 
social and economic environment of the countries. We find that the de-institutionalisation of 
marriage and unconventional family practices are associated with a negative educational gradient of 
divorce, while welfare state expenditure is associated with a more positive gradient. 
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Introduction 
The increase in divorce is one of the most visible changes in family life in Western countries. 
Despite this general trend, divorce is more common not only in some countries, but also in some 
social groups. These social differences reflect social inequalities in marital life and in the (mainly 
negative) consequences of divorce. However, these differences are not necessarily stable across 
time and space. For example, the current American experience of the lower class character of single 
parenthood does not characterize all earlier periods or all countries (McLanahan, 2004). Despite 
these findings, studies on divorce risk factors usually start from the assumption that the effects of 
these are constant across time and across societies, even though there are good theoretical reasons 
to expect otherwise (Teachman, 2002: 332).  
 
William J. Goode was probably the first to argue a link between societal factors and the social 
composition of divorce. In a series of papers (Goode, 1962; 1970; 1993), he suggested that the 
relationship between the social composition of divorce and the level of modernization was inverse. 
He expected that the once positive relationship between social status and divorce – characteristic of 
the early stages of modernization with high legal, social, and economic barriers to divorce – would 
gradually fade away as these barriers did. In the end, divorce would be more common in the lower 
classes, generally accompanied by more marital strain. In the same way, one can also expect cross-
national differences in the social structure of divorce, depending on the social, legal and economic 
environment of family life. 
 
In this paper, we examine the effects of female education on divorce over time in seventeen 
countries (Austria, Estonia, Finland, Flanders (Belgium), France, West-Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA). Starting from 
Goode’s hypothesis, we ask 1) whether there are cross-country differences in the educational 
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gradient of divorce, 2) whether the effect of education on divorce has become more negative, and 3) 
whether the differences between countries and across time can be linked to macro-level variables 
reflecting the legal and socio-economic environment of family life. With data from the Fertility and 
Family Surveys (FFS), we first establish the stabilities and changes by performing discrete-time 
event history analyses in each country, and then continue with multilevel discrete-time event history 
analyses to look for explanations for the patterns found.  
 
Female education and divorce: theoretical perspectives 
The most well-known hypothesis concerning the effects of female education on divorce is found in 
Gary Becker’s economic theory of the family (e.g., Becker, 1981). Becker argued that because 
education improves women’s chances in the labour market and thus their economic independence, 
but decreases the economic gains of marriage, women with more education will divorce more 
easily. Women with higher education might also hold more liberal values (Levinger, 1976), or have 
better resources for handling the divorce process (Blossfeld et al., 1995), thus being more prone to 
end an unsatisfactory relationship.  
 
Other accounts, however, lead to opposite predictions. It has been argued that education improves 
resources – such as social, cultural, economic and cognitive skills – that increase the stability of 
relationships, either by successful partner matching or by enhancing communication skills and other 
factors that make a relationship work (Amato, 1996; Ono, 1998; Hoem, 1997; Dronkers, 2002). In 
line with the original Goode hypothesis, we can also assume that those in the lower social strata 
have more marital strain due to greater socio-economic hardship (also Hoem, 1997; Oppenheimer, 
1997; Jalovaara, 2003). In addition, as women’s economic resources have become increasingly 
important for the status of the whole family (Oppenheimer, 1997), men have increasingly more to 
loose from divorcing highly educated women.  
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Despite the opposing predictions made by these hypotheses, all these theories share an assumption 
that marriages are maintained as long as the well-being of the partner(s) exceeds that of divorce (cf. 
Teachman, 2002: 331-2). The main difference between the theories is in the mechanisms 
(economic, social, cultural, cognitive) emphasised. There seems to be no a priori reason to rule out 
the possibility that these mechanisms operate simultaneously, even if in opposing directions. The 
resulting effect of female education on divorce thus depends on the balance of these different 
mechanisms.  
 
Cross-country and period differences in the effects of female education? 
Which socio-economic variables affect the balance between the mechanisms discussed above, and 
thus influence the educational gradient of divorce? Following the general costs and benefits 
approach outlined above, one can point to various legal, social and economic factors, which affect 
both the costs of divorce and the benefits of marriage.  
 
An obvious factor is divorce legislation. The effect of the liberalization in divorce laws on divorce 
rates has been a topic of great interest, and results suggest that the liberalisation of legislation 
increases divorce rates, at least in the short run (Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2003). The strictness of 
divorce laws may not, however, have equal effects on all marriages. Goode (1970 [1963]: 85-86) 
hypothesised that strict divorce laws would mainly suppress the chances of divorce among the 
lower classes, while the upper classes would be more resourceful in finding ways to get around 
strict rules. Goode went on to argue that with more liberal laws, “the normal difficulties of lower-
class family life were permitted an expression in divorce” (ibid.).  
 
Social norms and conventions surrounding family life can produce similar differences. First, strict 
social norms against the dissolution of a union may require extra resources (such as high levels of 
education) to overcome them, whereas loosened norms of marital life reduce the importance of such 
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resources. Second, if divorce is relatively rare in a society, such behaviour is more innovative, thus, 
again, requiring more resources. Later, through social learning, such behaviour can spread to the 
wider population and the lower classes (Chan and Halpin, 2005).  
 
The economic environment, including the welfare state, is apparently important in shaping the 
relative costs and benefits of divorce. First, good female labour market possibilities decrease 
women’s dependency on their husbands. When female participation in the labour market is 
acceptable and widespread, even women with lower levels of human capital have better chances for 
economic independence. The welfare state can have similar effects: with extensive and generous 
welfare benefits and services, women can support themselves and their children independently, 
either by working or through benefits (cf. Orloff, 1993). Here again, the effect may be more 
pronounced among less educated women. On the other hand, welfare states may also reduce 
economic strain (cf. Hoem, 1997; Oppenheimer, 1997; Jalovaara, 2003), thus stabilizing marriages 
among the lower classes.  
 
Previous results and hypotheses 
What is the empirical evidence regarding the effects of female education on divorce? In general, the 
results are mixed. American, Nordic, and British studies generally find a negative effect (e.g., 
Bumpass and Sweet, 1972; Hoem, 1997; Berrington and Diamond, 1999; Teachman, 2002; 
Jalovaara, 2003; Lyngstad, 2004). Other studies, however, claim different results. German and 
Dutch research has generally reported a positive effect (e.g., Diekmann and Klein, 1991; Kalmijn et 
al., 2004). Support for cross-national differences is also provided by Blossfeld and colleagues 
(1995), who found the strongest positive effects in Italy, followed by Germany, and then Sweden. 
Comparative differences were also found in the earlier cross-national case studies Chester’s 
Divorce in Europe (1977). 
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Few studies have explicitly tested for change in the effect of female education on union disruption. 
Again, the results from these few studies have given conflicting results. Martin and Bumpass (1989) 
found that the effect had generally become more negative in the younger American marriage 
cohorts, whereas Teachman’s (2002) results pointed to stability in the educational gradient of 
divorce. Härkönen (2005) reported a similar result for Finland. However, the findings of Raley and 
Bumpass (2003) do seem to suggest that union disruption has increased among the lower groups in 
the US, but stayed stable in the upper ones. For the UK, Chan and Halpin (2005) found that the 
relationship between female education and divorce has changed from a positive to a negative one, 
and similar changes were also found in Sweden by Hoem (1997).  
 
These results send conflicting messages. On the one hand, the cross-country (and some cross-
cohort) differences suggest that societal level factors do have an effect, as suggested by the 
theoretical discussion above. On the other, one may expect more consistent trends across countries, 
following from the profound changes in all post-war Western societies. Different results could be 
attributable to different model specifications. Therefore, in order to draw better conclusions, more 
consistent analyses with comparable data and models are needed.  
 
Based on the theoretical discussion and previous research, we formulate four hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of education on divorce risk varies across countries. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of education on divorce risk becomes more negative, that is, the divorce 
risk of less educated women increases relative to women with higher educational levels.  
Hypothesis 3: Lower legal, social and economic costs of divorce increase the divorce risk of less 
educated women relative to better educated women, thus making the effect of education on divorce 
more negative.  
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Data and methods 
The Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) 
We use data for our seventeen countries from the Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS), collected by 
the Population Activities Unit of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (see 
Andersson and Philipov, 2002). The FFS is a retrospective survey, which includes information on 
the fertility, family, education, and occupational histories of those interviewed. The data were 
collected between 1989 and 1999, in different years in different countries. We selected the first 
marriages of women who reported having been married (1), and who were aged 17 years or more at 
the time of their first marriage. To be suitable for event-history analysis in discrete time, we re-
organized the data into person-year form (Yamaguchi, 1991). After considerable data cleaning, we 
ended up with a sample of 44 229 women, 511 714 person-years, and 7 978 divorces in 17 countries 
(see table 1) (2). Our dependent variable is divorce, which was coded 1 if the marriage dissolved at 
a particular year, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Our main independent variable is educational attainment, which was coded into three categories, 
according to the ISCED-scheme: low (0-2), middle (3), and high (4-6) (see Table 1). Our education 
variable measures the educational attainment of the respondent at the time of interview. Although 
not an optimal measure for our purposes, this was decided on after even more serious problems 
were discovered as to other possible measures. For example, educational histories were missing for 
a large number of our countries. The same problems prevented the use of years of education as 
well.  
 
As controls, we include the linear and squared terms of marital duration, age at marriage, parental 
divorce, pre-marital cohabitation and pre-marital children (see Table 1). We lacked information on 
parental divorce for the Norwegian data, and on cohabitation for the Estonian data. In the first 
event-history analyses, we use the year of marriage to measure the changing social environment of 
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union disruption (3). However, because we include duration (linear and quadratic terms) in the 
models, and since cohort plus duration equals period, the effects of the year of marriage can be 
interpreted as either cohort or period effects (see Allison, 1995: 142-3; Teachman, 2002). Following 
Teachman (2002), we interpret the marriage cohort variables as capturing the period effect of a 
change in the social context of family life (4) (5). This interpretation is supported by the large body 
of literature pointing to the importance of period effects over cohort effects (Thornton and Rodgers, 
1987; Lutz et al., 1991).  
 
Macro-variables  
To analyse the effects of the societal environment in shaping the costs of divorce, we collected data 
on divorce legislation, social policies, the value environment, family practices, and the “general 
level of modernization” (see Table 1; for a more detailed description, see Härkönen and Dronkers, 
2006). The time-dependent nature of the variables varied. For some measures (for instance divorce 
legislation, extra-marital births, female economic activity, and urbanization levels) we were able to 
find data for relatively long time periods. For others (such as value measures), we had to restrict 
ourselves to a few time-points, or on occasion only one. In general, with the exception of divorce 
legislation, one decade was the basic unit of time used. The averages and standard deviations are 
given in Table 1, based on person-year categories, both total and per country. If the standard 
deviation of a macro-variable is zero that variable is not time dependent, but varies between 
countries only. A standard deviation of more than zero means that the variable is time-dependent, or 
that we found data for only one point in time. The case of divorce legislation is the only instance 
where the lack of variation in time reflects the stability of the divorce law of a country and not a 
lack of data.  
 
Divorce legislation. The strictness of divorce legislation is measured with a single time-dependent 
variable. During the period of study, divorce legislation varied considerably, from prohibition of 
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divorce to unilateral no-fault divorce. We use a three-fold categorisation as our divorce law 
measure (cf. Glendon, 1987; Castles and Flood, 1993): 
(1) Divorce not permitted (1a), or permitted on the grounds of fault or other major disruption of 
marital life (1b). The institutionalisation of marriage remains the leading principle, and the 
divorce process (if permitted) is difficult and lengthy. 
(2) Divorce permitted, possibly alongside (1b), on the mutual consent of the spouses, prolonged 
separation, other measures of factual breakdown of marriage, or other less restrictive 
legislation. Shows more understanding for the will of the spouses. 
(3) No (or very minor) judicial grounds to deny divorce: unilateral non-fault divorce granted on 
the basis of the will of either spouse with very short waiting or “reconsideration” times. 
We joined (1a) and (1b) into a common category, because the small number of events in (1a) did 
not permit sustainable analysis. This is also used as the reference category. 
 
Data on divorce laws were collected from Boschan (1972), Chester (1977), Chloros (1978), 
Lobodzinska (1982), Moskoff (1983), Glendon (1987; 1989), Goode (1993), Nakonezny et al. 
(1995), Friedberg (1998), and Hamilton and Perry (2002). In some cases, classifying a country was 
not very straightforward. The trickiest case was the United States, where individual states have their 
own divorce laws (Glendon, 1987, 1989; Nakonezny et al., 1995; Friedberg, 1998). Since we could 
not distinguish between different states, we treated the US as a single case (6).  
 
Welfare state. Welfare states are measured with two expenditure variables, social expenditure per 
GDP (general size of the welfare state) and family cash benefits per GDP (more targeted 
expenditure). For most countries, we were able to construct good time-series of the developments of 
these social policy measures with data from the ILO (1967; 1988) and the OECD (1997). The 
exception was Poland, for which we found data for only one point in time.  
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Values. We include two variables reflecting the value environment: the percentage of denounced 
atheists to measure (non)religiosity (Barrett et al., 2001); and the national mean of a ten-point scale 
question enquiring whether one finds divorce justifiable or not, from the World Values Study 
(1981; 1990; 1995) and the European Values Study (for Greece) (1999). For the former variable, 
the first data were found from 1970 onwards (projected back for earlier periods), for the latter, 
mainly from 1981 only.  
 
Family practices. We measure family practices with a single time-dependent variable of 
“unconventional family practices”, which is a sum measure of the percentage of extra-marital 
births, the share of divorces per 100 marriages, and the percentage of 25-year olds who have ever 
lived in a consensual union (OECD 2002; Council of Europe 2000; FFS standard country tables 
http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/ffs/f_h_151b.htm). These variables were strongly correlated (0.7-
0.8), and therefore they were combined to proxy the social costs and innovativeness of divorce, and 
the “conventionality” of the family institution.  
 
Modernity and the labour market. We use three variables as indicators of female labour market 
conditions and “modernity”: the degree of urbanization, the percentage of employment in the 
service sector, and the percentage of economically active women (World Bank World Development 
Indicators; ILO Labour statistics http://laborsta.ilo.org/; United Nations Common Database 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd).  
 
Models 
Within-country discrete-time event history models 
In our first analyses, we model the effects of female education on the risk of union disruption 
separately in each country with discrete-time event history analysis techniques (Yamaguchi, 1991). 
Event-history analysis regresses the conditional probability of experiencing an event at time t 
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(union disruption) – providing that it has not happened before – on selected covariates, as described 
above. Data subsequently transformed to discrete-time format are analysed with logistic regression 
models using STATA 8.2 software.  
 
Multilevel models 
We use multilevel discrete-time event history models to test for the effects of the macro-variables. 
Replacing countries with variables is generally regarded as a valuable strategy in comparative 
research (e.g., Przeworski and Teune, 1970). Here, we deal with an additional dimension, historical 
time, and therefore we replace country at a specific period (measured by union cohort in the within-
country models) with direct measures of divorce legislation, social policies, values, demographical 
practices, and the level of the economy. To analyze these data, the data file is restructured into a two-
level data structure: duration of the first marriage (organized in person-years) and countries at a 
particular point in time (Hox, 2002).  
 
The models include the education dummies, the duration terms, parental divorce, marriage cohort, 
interactions between education and marriage cohort, the main effect of the macro-variables, and the 
interactions between the macro-variables and education. Similar to the discrete-time event history 
analyses in the previous section, the data are analysed with multilevel logistic regression models (cf. 
Hox, 2002). The models were estimated using MLwiN (Rasbash et al., 2000). 
 
Results from event history analyses  
To get an overview of the relationship between female education and divorce in the seventeen 
countries, Table 3 shows the main effects of education. We estimated two models for each country. 
The first model (Model A) is a reduced form model, with education, linear and squared terms of 
marital duration, year of marriage, and parental divorce (except for Norway). This model, including 
a minimal number of control variables, is used to estimate the “gross” effect of education. The 
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second model (Model B) adds age at marriage, pre-marital cohabitation (except for Estonia) and 
pre-marital birth. These variables are not control variables in the strict sense, because they are also 
affected by education. However, because these variables are often included in models on divorce 
risks, we estimated this model in order to estimate a more conservative “net” effect for education, 
after adjusting for the three important intervening variables. The estimates of the control variables 
are mainly in line with what would be expected on the basis of the existing literature, with pre-
marital cohabitation, pre-marital children and parental divorce showing a positive effect, whereas 
the coefficient for age at marriage is negative. 
 
As to the effects of education, Table 2 shows two main results of interest for this paper. First, the 
effect of education on divorce varies across countries, and second, this result is rather robust with 
regard to model specification.  
 
According to the A Models, women with high or medium levels of education have lower divorce 
risks than poorly educated women in Austria, Lithuania and the USA. Furthermore, highly educated 
women have lower divorce risks than women with low or medium education in Flanders. In France 
and Spain, women with medium education divorce more than women with low education, in Greece 
highly educated women stand out with higher divorce risks, and in Italy and Poland both 
educational groups divorce more than the poorly educated. For the other countries we do not find 
statistically significant differences.  
 
TABLE 2 
 
The inclusion of the three additional variables in the B Models generally moves the point estimates 
in a more positive direction. This changes the results for some countries. The negative and 
significant effects of high education in the A Models for Flanders and the USA become non-
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significant, and the same estimate for the Norwegian model becomes positive and significant. The 
positive estimates in Model A generally become stronger (France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain), 
while the negative Austrian and Lithuanian estimates do not change significantly. These results can 
be interpreted as showing that women with less education are at the aggregate level more likely to 
engage in behaviours that increase the risk of divorce. According to more detailed analyses of the 
changes in the point estimates (not shown, available on request), women with less education marry 
younger and are usually more likely to have a child out of wedlock, whereas women with higher 
education levels more frequently cohabit before marriage. 
 
The estimates in most cases are different in Model B as compared to Model A, thus, in some 
countries, changing the conclusions on the effect of education on divorce. More importantly for this 
paper, however, differences between the countries remain. Adding the three variables does not 
explain the differences between countries in the educational gradient of divorce. The country 
differences are mainly as one would expect on the basis of the literature and substantive knowledge 
of the countries. The most surprising result is perhaps the negative gradient in Austria. The non-
negative gradients in the Nordic countries do not conform to results from many previous studies (cf. 
Hoem, 1997; Lyngstad, 2002; Jalovaara, 2003).  
 
In Table 3 we test whether the educational gradients have changed over time. We insert interaction 
terms between the year of marriage and the education dummies into Model A of Table 2 and 
compare the models with regular chi-square tests. We chose to use the reduced form equation in 
order to boost statistical power, especially given the limited number of events in some countries. 
However, the results from these models were very similar to those from models including the three 
intervening variables (not shown). In a manner similar to the main effects models, the inclusion of 
the intervening variables made the main effects more positive, and weakened the statistical 
significance of the model fit statistic in Italy and, to a greater degree, in the United States. For the 
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most part, however, the interaction effects remained very similar. This suggests that the change in 
the educational gradient of divorce is not exerted through the intervening variables. The results in 
the fifth column of Table 3 show the differences in the chi-squares and the degrees of freedom 
between the models. We can see that the inclusion of the interaction terms improves the model’s fit 
for Flanders, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the United States. In France and 
Italy the model including the interactions provides a better fit, which is significant at the 10 % level. 
In these nine countries, thus, there has been a change in the relationship between female education 
and divorce risk (7). 
 
TABLE 3 
 
Columns six to ten report the parameter estimates of the main effects and the interaction terms of 
the year of marriage and education. They show that, as predicted by our second hypothesis, all the 
significant interactions have a negative sign (8). In Finland, France, Hungary, Poland and Sweden, 
the risk of divorce for those with high or medium levels of education decreased relative to the less 
educated, whereas in Flanders, Italy and the United States there was a decrease only among the 
highly educated.  
 
The results suggesting a change in Finland and the US contradicts previous results by Härkönen 
(2005) and Teachman (2002), but are in line with those by Raley and Bumpass (2003). However, as 
mentioned above, these studies used different model specifications, and in the case of the latter two, 
different time periods. This also explains the conflicting results between Table 2 and some Finnish 
and Swedish studies (Hoem, 1997; Jalovaara, 2003). In Finland and Sweden the educational 
gradient of divorce was clearly positive in the oldest marriage cohorts (see also Blossfeld et al., 
1995), but became more negative later. The cross-cohort differences thus cancel each other out.  
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In conclusion, the results in Table 3 support our second hypothesis of a change towards a more 
negative educational gradient of divorce in nine of our seventeen countries.  
 
Results from multilevel event-history analyses 
Table 4 shows the results from our first multilevel analyses with the data pooled over all countries 
(9). Model A includes the micro-variables and the interactions between education and marriage 
cohort. As expected, the interaction terms between year of marriage and education are negative and 
significant, pointing to an increasingly lower education gradient of divorce at the aggregate level of 
the sixteen countries (10). As seen from the bottom row, significant between-country variance 
remains.  
 
Next (Models B to J), we add each macro-variable and its interaction with the education dummies 
separately to Model A. This is the first step in examining how specific macro-level factors are 
associated with the differences in the educational gradient of divorce. The main effects of the 
macro-variables are in most cases significant, while the estimates of the micro-variables remain 
considerably stable. However, we are more interested in the coefficients of the interaction terms and 
the changes in the interaction between the year of marriage and education.  
 
Examining the interaction terms between the macro-variables and education, we can see that 
divorce legislation and the social value variables are not associated with cross-national and 
temporal differences in the educational gradient of divorce. At the same time, we find that more 
favourable female labour markets (measured with service-employment and female labour market 
activity) and more unconventional family practices are associated with a more negative educational 
divorce gradient, as expected on the basis of the third hypothesis. Urbanization is also related to 
lower rates of divorce among women having completed higher education. Higher social spending, 
and overall social expenditure in particular, is associated with a more positive educational gradient. 
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When we look at changes in the interaction terms between education and marriage cohort, we can 
see that the value of the term changes by more than the standard error only in Models G 
(unconventional family types) and I (employment in services).  
 
Table 5 continues the analyses by combining some of the macro-variables in the same model. Due 
to a limited number of countries, we chose only the most important variable from each group, based 
on the significance and strength of the interaction terms. The model thus includes social 
expenditure, unconventional family types, and the percentage of economically active women. The 
model including all three macro-variables and their interactions with educational attainment failed 
to converge. Therefore, Models L to N include the three different combinations of two variables.  
 
First, Model K shows the main effects of the three macro-variables and the micro-variables. The 
effect of social expenditure is positive, while surprisingly enough, that of female economic activity 
is negative. The main effect of unconventional families is non-significant. When we include 
unconventional family types and female economic activity, along with their interactions with 
education in the same model (Model L), the interaction between female economic activity and high 
education becomes non-significant, while that between female economic activity and medium 
levels of education is barely significant at the 10 percent level (11). On the other hand, the 
parameters for the interactions between unconventional families and education remain significant 
(and negative). In the other two combinations (social expenditure and unconventional families; 
social expenditure and female activity), all the interactions remain significant. The signs of the 
significant interactions are the same as in Table 4. The negative relationship between the 
educational gradient and higher female labour market activity is as expected (Model N), whereas 
the finding that higher social expenditure is still related to a more positive educational gradient 
contradicts our third hypothesis.  
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Based on the multilevel models, we conclude that many of the macro-variables have no significant 
effect on the educational gradient of divorce. Two societal factors stand out, however. A change in 
the family institution towards more liberal and unconventional practices (divorces, out-of-wedlock 
births, cohabitation) is associated with a more negative educational gradient of divorce, whereas a 
more generous welfare state (proxied by social expenditure per capita) is related to a more positive 
gradient.  
 
Conclusions and discussion 
In this paper, we have examined the relationship between female educational attainment and the 
risk of divorce across marriage cohorts in sixteen European countries and the USA with data from 
the Fertility and Family Surveys. Beginning with a hypothesis by William J. Goode (1962), we 
expected that this effect varies across countries, and that the effect of education on divorce would 
become more negative over time. We also aimed to link this variation to cross-national and cross-
temporal differences in the legal, social and economic costs of divorce, measured by the strictness 
of divorce legislation, social policies, values, family practices, and social and labour market 
conditions.  
 
After estimating event-history models separately for each country, we found that overall, the 
educational gradient of divorce was positive in France, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain, and 
negative in Austria, Flanders, Lithuania and the USA. In the other countries, statistically significant 
differences were not found. We also found that, in line with our second hypothesis, the educational 
gradient became more negative in Flanders, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, 
Sweden and the USA. In the other countries, no changes were found.  
 
The overall country differences in the educational gradients seem to support Goode’s hypothesis of 
a positive association between the costs of divorce and its educational or class gradient. The 
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countries found to have positive gradients were as expected, although the negative gradients in 
Austria and Flanders can be regarded as somewhat surprising. Goode also made a farsighted 
hypothesis of a change towards a more negative educational gradient of divorce, a pattern found in 
nine of the seventeen countries.  
 
Our further analyses of the relationship between the educational gradient of divorce and the direct 
measures of its legal, social, and economic environment point to two factors of particular 
importance. First, a change towards a less marriage-centered family institution and more 
unconventional family practices is associated with faster growth in divorce rates in the lower strata 
of society. This can be interpreted as meaning that the high social costs (in terms of sanctions, 
innovativeness, and so on) of divorce demand resources if they are to be overcome. These same 
resources can be helpful in establishing and maintaining a stable marriage when these costs are low. 
From this point of view, however, it was surprising to find no relationship between the strictness of 
divorce legislation and the educational gradient (cf. Goode, 1970: 85-86). Second, we found that 
welfare state generosity is related to a more positive educational gradient of divorce. This is 
contrary to our hypothesis. This may suggest that welfare state generosity helps in stabilizing 
marriages amongst those with less human capital, and more economic-based marital strain (cf. 
Goode, 1962; Oppenheimer, 1997; Jalovaara, 2003). We also found a link between increasing 
female labour market opportunities and a negative educational gradient. This, however, disappeared 
when we controlled for unconventional family types and this variable’s interaction with education, 
suggesting that the social and cultural aspects of family change are more important than the closely 
related female labour market possibilities.  
 
Needless to say, more research is needed to test the robustness of these findings and interpretations. 
While we have been able to establish cross-national variation in the partial correlation between 
female education and divorce, further research on the changes in the educational gradient – with 
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larger national datasets – would be welcome. Furthermore, we are able to point only tentatively to 
some factors behind these differences and trends. In this sense, the situation is similar to the 
research on the increasingly negative educational gradient of single motherhood in the United 
States (Ellwood and Jencks, 2004). The cross-country differences may also reflect other things, 
such as different patterns of selection in education and marriage (12). Moreover, we acknowledge 
the possible restrictions posed by the data and the macro-variables in particular. Nevertheless, 
however tentative they may be, we do think that our results point to important factors behind the 
differences across time and between countries. Further research is needed to test the hypotheses of 
the factors shaping the educational gradient of divorce. We also agree with the concerns of 
cumulative disadvantage (family and labour market) among the less educated and their families 
(McLanahan, 2004). Even though some of the factors behind these differential trends may be hard 
to change, our results suggest that public policy can play a role in equalizing the chances for stable 
families and the benefits associated with them.  
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Notes 
 
(1) The processes affecting higher order marriages are different from those affecting first marriages 
(e.g. Martin and Bumpass, 1989). Men were excluded due to the few cases in the data. 
 
(2) Because in some countries (Italy, Poland, Greece, Spain) there were only a few divorces in the 
early periods, we did not censor durations of more than ten, fifteen, or twenty years. However, the 
models with a censoring on the 15
th
 year of the union (if still intact) gave very similar results (not 
shown). We also coded death and “forced living apart together” as censored. A competing-risks 
analysis with these categories did not change our results. 
 
(3) Year of marriage was recoded to start from 0.  
 
(4) Following Thornton and Rodgers (1987) and Teachman (2002), we also tested whether the risk 
of divorce at different durations varied across the marriage cohorts. In a model with the main and 
squared effect of duration, and an interaction between duration and marriage cohort (not shown), 
we did not find stability of dissolution risk at different durations across cohorts. We thus conclude 
that, if we disregard the assumption of a strong interaction effect between marriage cohort and 
duration, our data support the hypothesis of period effects instead of cohort effects.  
 
(5) Using a direct period measure would have been inconvenient, since in Italy, Spain, Greece, and 
Poland the number of divorces in the early periods was too small to permit sustainable analyses.  
 
(6) We used the year 1970 (when California was the first state to enact no-fault legislation) as a 
breakpoint between categories 1 and 2, and the year 1985 (when South Dakota was the last state to 
enact no-fault divorce) as a breakpoint in a move from category 2 to category 3. This solution 
admittedly provides only an approximation, but since “divorce tourism” between states was 
possible (Castles and Flood, 1993), and since the law in many cases was a dead letter with pressures 
from neighbouring states, we regard this as a second-best option.  
 
(7) Due to the limited number of events in some countries, the data might not reveal some actual 
changes.   
 
(8) Most of the non-significant coefficients also have a negative sign.  
 
(9) Norway is excluded, since information on parental divorce is not available. 
 
(10) We also confirmed the findings from the previous section concerning significant variation in 
the effects of education with random coefficient models (not shown).  
 
(11) We also tested whether replacing female economic activity with percentage of employment in 
services as a measure of female labour market opportunities would change the results (not shown). 
The interaction terms between service employment and education were both non-significant, 
whereas estimates of the interactions between unconventional family types and education were the 
same as in Model L.  
 
(12) In our companion paper, we compared results from first marriages to results from all first 
unions (Härkönen and Dronkers,2006). As a general conclusion, the results were remarkably 
similar, thus suggesting no effects of differential selection to marriage.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (mean of year-person units and standard deviation) of the individual characteristics and the macro-variables 
 Total Austria Flanders  Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Italy  Latvia Lithuania Norway Poland Spain Sweden Switzerland USA 
Year collected  1995-6 1991-2 1994 1989-
90 
1994 1992 1999 1992-3 1995-
6 
1995 1994-5 1988-9 1991 1994-
5 
1992-3 1994-5 1995 
N. cases 44229 3207 2396 912 3063 1689 1410 1962 2707 3144 2108 2257 2341 3104 2589 1846 3053 6424 
Person-years 511714 46385 22708 8948 40339 21742 12973 26529 27946 42653 24089 25319 25956 40465 32656 17379 35265 60362 
Divorces 7978 589 249 247 554 687 257 124 436 166 614 354 360 212 142 345 473 2169 
Duration in years 16.34 
(7.18) 
20.22 
(8.57) 
12.59 
(4.78) 
14.23 
(7.03) 
18.09 
(7.37) 
17.19 
(7.28) 
12.32 
(5.11) 
18.42 
(7.20) 
13.79 
(5.40) 
18.32 
(6.83) 
15.88 
(7.05) 
16.23 
(7.20) 
15.08 
(5.81) 
17.46 
(6.59) 
16.74 
(6.42) 
14.22 
(6.44) 
16.38 
(7.19) 
13.72 
(6.59) 
Age at marruage 21.81 
(4.23) 
21.66 
(3.40) 
20.96 
(2.41) 
21.89 
(3.18) 
21.81 
(3.32) 
21.08 
(3.09) 
21.67 
(3.07) 
21.77 
(3.64) 
20.33 
(4.83) 
22.00 
(3.29) 
21.44 
(3.27) 
23.30 
(11.49) 
21.82 
(2.97) 
21.30 
(2.97) 
22.24 
(3.12) 
23.24 
(4.04) 
23.24 
(3.66) 
21.47 
(3.58) 
Year of marriage 76.17 
(7.20) 
74.33 
(8.30) 
78.03 
(4.67) 
77.68 
(6.90) 
69.71 
(7.13) 
74.35 
(6.46) 
78.85 
(4.98) 
80.16 
(7.12) 
78.16 
(5.11) 
76.43 
(6.73) 
77.19 
(6.57) 
77.34 
(6.97) 
72.31 
(5.61) 
73.01 
(6.55) 
77.90 
(6.36) 
76.76 
(6.29) 
77.20 
(7.02) 
79.33 
(6.21) 
Low education % 35.14 26.36 36.55 14.49 31.17 47.76 56.24 47.34 50.20 62.20 7.04 6.09 21.08 54.63 80.35 17.66 17.85 14.35 
Middle education 
level % 
43.23 55.77 37.15 66.19 52.93 37.00 34.00 30.13 37.38 30.39 70.19 58.18 41.81 32.50 10.32 45.56 71.50 38.32 
High education 
level % 
21.62 17.87 26.30 19.31 15.90 15.24 9.76 22.53 12.42 7.41 22.77 35.73 37.11 12.86 9.33 36.78 10.65 47.34 
Parental divorce % 9.50 8.58 6.56 22.13 5.52 9.91 9.69 2.69 14.74 2.69 19.06 13.95 - 2.34 3.20 9.46 9.38 20.34 
Previous 
cohabitation % 
25.28 35.07 7.42 - 30.81 29.91 38.67 23.82 10.85 3.50 28.73 11.56 30.95 3.01 3.57 78.93 43.68 30.28 
Birth before 
marriage % 
7.70 16.52 1.14 14.04 4.48 6.54 8.49 2.45 3.64 2.73 4.19 2.78 9.55 3.27 1.57 31.42 7.08 15.06 
Strict, 
Institutionalized 
divorce laws  
.09 
.28 
.00 
.00 
.86 
.35 
.00 
.03 
.00 
.00 
.14 
.35 
.00 
.00 
.18 
.38 
.00 
.00 
.46 
.50 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.01 
.07 
Less strict, more 
individual divorce 
laws  
.84 
.37 
1.00 
.00 
.14 
.35 
1.00 
.03 
.83 
.38 
.86 
.35 
1.00 
.00 
.82 
.38 
1.00 
.00 
.52 
.50 
1.00 
.00 
1.00 
.00 
1.00 
.00 
1.00 
.00 
.81 
.40 
.09 
.28 
1.00 
.00 
.99 
.07 
Pure unilateral 
divorce laws  
.06 
.24 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.17 
.38 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.91 
.28 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
% social 
expenditure of GDP  
19.01 
5.25 
23.45 
2.42 
24.95 
1.40 
13.50 
.61 
18.49 
4.63 
21.90 
4.63 
21.63 
1.96 
19.57 
4.29 
18.24 
1.47 
22.56 
2.44 
13.54 
.55 
13.54 
.52 
21.01 
3.72 
16.20 
.00 
17.94 
2.09 
29.95 
4.11 
16.99 
3.61 
12.93 
.96 
% of family cash 
benefits of GDP  
12.28 
8.46 
22.25 
2.58 
25.34 
3.63 
2.89 
.32 
12.59 
4.50 
21.88 
1.51 
12.71 
2.88 
7.87 
3.24 
27.10 
3.27 
8.40 
2.14 
2.92 
.28 
2.93 
.26 
12.33 
2.47 
18.00 
.00 
3.16 
1.50 
18.86 
4.02 
9.19 
2.76 
2.57 
1.18 
% atheists or non-
religious  
11.49 
9.62 
7.10 
1.06 
7.21 
.04 
39.61 
2.40 
5.28 
.60 
19.05 
1.18 
13.99 
6.42 
1.85 
.05 
12.55 
.26 
15.77 
.57 
35.38 
1.66 
14.17 
1.78 
2.14 
.25 
3.36 
1.24 
5.41 
.29 
29.31 
.64 
7.23 
.78 
8.82 
.34 
‘divorce justifiable’  52.61 
7.94 
49.00 
.00 
46.95 
3.78 
54.00 
.00 
64.92 
7.00 
55.72 
1.89 
55.35 
3.24 
63.00 
.00 
48.86 
2.10 
53.30 
1.27 
54.00 
.00 
40.00 
.00 
50.70 
2.49 
39.00 
.00 
54.25 
3.57 
62.33 
.95 
59.95 
6.96 
48.55 
.84 
unconventional 
family types  
82.41 
46.14 
105.85 
24.54 
55.01 
16.89 
135.57 
9.173 
105.55 
41.41 
93.99 
30.90 
86.34 
7.73 
40.96 
5.68 
67.71 
13.53 
18.45 
5.29 
109.81 
9.04 
74.24 
3.63 
99.09 
38.10 
25.29 
3.70 
25.44 
10.05 
170.46 
14.67 
84.23 
16.11 
122.91 
19.32 
degree urbanization 68.62 
9.63 
67.12 
.16 
95.98 
.57 
70.10 
1.58 
58.40 
4.19 
73.48 
.77 
84.14 
1.40 
58.49 
.71 
59.69 
2.81 
66.57 
.47 
69.16 
1.85 
64.81 
4.42 
70.32 
1.95 
58.52 
2.51 
74.30 
1.84 
82.97 
.50 
58.44 
1.56 
74.60 
.74 
Employment in 
services 
53.02 
10.87 
51.71 
3.92 
65.98 
4.04 
42.79 
1.73 
53.98 
5.46 
51.30 
5.11 
53.58 
5.12 
47.38 
4.16 
43.00 
4.57 
55.55 
6.04 
43.09 
1.81 
38.14 
3.55 
62.93 
5.04 
33.72 
3.07 
51.49 
5.65 
61.94 
4.24 
57.13 
3.86 
68.84 
2.94 
% women 
economically active  
58.47 
12.22 
54.31 
1.83 
44.69 
3.39 
77.22 
1.44 
67.99 
3.95 
55.61 
2.31 
55.19 
2.18 
39.75 
4.66 
60.44 
1.44 
42.49 
3.35 
76.16 
1.16 
71.94 
2.06 
59.91 
9.35 
66.55 
1.26 
37.69 
5.18 
73.39 
8.16 
56.69 
4.83 
62.90 
4.77 
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Table 2. Relationship between female educational attainment and the risk of divorce, discrete-time event history models (standard errors in parentheses) 
 Austria  Flanders  Estonia  Finland  France  Germany  
Middle education -0.205* -0.202* -0.040 0.072 -0.092 -0.049 -0.035 0.059 0.195* 0.249** -0.090 -0.011 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.146) (0.149) (0.225) (0.231) (0.100) (0.101) (0.087) (0.088) (0.143) (0.146) 
High education -0.273* -0.301* -0.372* -0.014 -0.033 0.139 -0.139 0.149 0.154 0.332** -0.376 -0.223 
 (0.129) (0.130) (0.185) (0.205) (0.257) (0.269) (0.140) (0.146) (0.114) (0.120) (0.254) (0.260) 
Year of marriage 0.042** 0.048** 0.027 0.039* -0.023* -0.019 0.028** 0.027** 0.086** 0.084** 0.078** 0.096** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.019) 
Duration 0.110** 0.111** 0.162** 0.178** 0.121* 0.124* 0.069** 0.075** 0.161** 0.166** 0.159** 0.165** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.052) (0.053) 
Duration squared -0.004** -0.004** -0.006* -0.006* -0.008** -0.009** -0.002* -0.002* -0.004** -0.004** -0.005+ -0.006+ 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Parental divorce 0.689** 0.628** 1.030** 0.868** 0.472** 0.393* 0.660** 0.589** 0.504** 0.407** 0.861** 0.719** 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.176) (0.180) (0.156) (0.159) (0.144) (0.145) (0.112) (0.113) (0.164) (0.170) 
Age at marriage  -0.101**  -0.163**  -0.074**  -0.098**  -0.074**  -0.086** 
  (0.015)  (0.037)  (0.028)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.027) 
Out-of-wedlock  0.272*  0.820*  0.296  0.648**  0.546**  0.627** 
  (0.108)  (0.385)  (0.215)  (0.167)  (0.141)  (0.193) 
Cohabitation  0.235*  0.947**  -  0.275*  0.343**  0.141 
  (0.095)  (0.204)    (0.107)  (0.093)  (0.145) 
Constant -5.577** -3.657** -5.552** -2.591** -3.487** -2.044** -5.132** -3.275** -5.869** -4.525** -5.539** -4.030** 
 (0.205) (0.348) (0.316) (0.736) (0.330) (0.645) (0.195) (0.359) (0.204) (0.340) (0.324) (0.579) 
Events 581 581 247 247 201 201 552 552 675 675 239 239 
Person-years 46001 46001 22563 22563 7595 7595 40135 40135 21290 21290 12386 12386 
Log-likelihood -3056.49 -3028.10 -1333.56 -1313.14 -914.43 -910.46 -2894.09 -2865.10 -2890.18 -2867.07 -1152.39 -1142.70 
Chi-square 121.53 178.30 54.42 95.25 27.81 35.76 40.44 98.42 207.23 253.45 55.65 75.04 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
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Table 2. (cont.) 
 Greece  Hungary  Italy  Latvia  Lithuania  Norway  
Middle education 0.338 0.338 -0.060 -0.035 0.437* 0.600** -0.126 -0.067 -0.608** -0.600** -0.009 0.162 
 (0.253) (0.254) (0.106) (0.107) (0.174) (0.179) (0.167) (0.168) (0.205) (0.205) (0.147) (0.149) 
High education 0.697** 0.753** -0.074 -0.051 0.876** 1.248** -0.160 0.063 -0.445* -0.449* 0.086 0.452** 
 (0.251) (0.263) (0.156) (0.157) (0.240) (0.264) (0.183) (0.188) (0.211) (0.212) (0.149) (0.154) 
Year of marriage -0.011 -0.004 0.015 0.008 0.060** 0.069** 0.014+ 0.017* 0.039** 0.038** 0.041** 0.058** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Duration -0.049 -0.047 0.030 0.032 0.128** 0.131** 0.055* 0.063* 0.119** 0.120** 0.113** 0.127** 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.035) (0.035) (0.045) (0.045) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) 
Duration squared 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003+ -0.003+ -0.003** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005** -0.003* -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Parental divorce 1.127** 1.113** 0.429** 0.402** 1.220** 1.042** 0.396** 0.337** 0.612** 0.600** - - 
 (0.372) (0.372) (0.120) (0.121) (0.292) (0.295) (0.096) (0.097) (0.129) (0.129)   
Age at marriage  -0.018  0.013+  -0.105**  -0.087**  0.005  -0.194** 
  (0.032)  (0.007)  (0.029)  (0.017)  (0.004)  (0.024) 
Out-of-wedlock  1.128*  0.394+  0.108  0.390+  0.266  0.732** 
  (0.458)  (0.219)  (0.412)  (0.201)  (0.270)  (0.162) 
Cohabitation  -0.515+  0.338*  1.043**  0.052  0.378**  0.050 
  (0.282)  (0.149)  (0.272)  (0.094)  (0.145)  (0.130) 
Constant -5.261** -4.918** -4.457** -4.733** -7.562** -5.565** -3.923** -2.272** -4.997** -5.155** -5.338** -1.767** 
 (0.384) (0.698) (0.198) (0.237) (0.407) (0.675) (0.220) (0.394) (0.298) (0.318) (0.257) (0.518) 
Events 101 101 429 429 166 166 592 592 349 349 357 357 
Person-years 22492 22492 27622 27622 42287 42287 23118 23118 25041 25041 25477 25477 
Log-likelihood -637.57 -634.05 -2205.01 -2196.39 -1058.20 -1045.33 -2734.06 -2719.29 -1807.87 -1803.45 -1865.62 -1824.31 
Chi-square 18.38 25.43 14.77 32.01 54.31 80.04 39.79 69.32 60.06 68.90 24.94 107.56 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
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Table 2. (cont.) 
 Poland  Spain  Sweden  Switzerland  USA  
Middle education 0.350* 0.427** 0.798** 0.833** -0.012 0.031 -0.187 -0.120 -0.277** -0.124* 
 (0.152) (0.154) (0.216) (0.218) (0.152) (0.153) (0.120) (0.123) (0.061) (0.063) 
High education 0.363+ 0.471* 0.390 0.573* 0.020 0.176 0.014 0.135 -0.409** -0.097 
 (0.203) (0.211) (0.263) (0.272) (0.158) (0.163) (0.170) (0.176) (0.061) (0.064) 
Year of marriage 0.035** 0.036** 0.053** 0.051** 0.007 0.019 0.014+ 0.009 -0.000 0.014** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) 
Duration 0.034 0.037 0.044 0.052 0.067+ 0.069+ 0.152** 0.152** 0.009 0.018 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.048) (0.048) (0.036) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.014) (0.014) 
Duration squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006** -0.006** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parental divorce 0.500 0.416 0.901** 0.592+ 0.707** 0.616** 0.725** 0.657** 0.437** 0.324** 
 (0.344) (0.347) (0.317) (0.324) (0.147) (0.149) (0.124) (0.124) (0.049) (0.050) 
Age at marriage  -0.040  -0.119**  -0.063**  -0.062**  -0.106** 
  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.008) 
Out-of-wedlock  0.863**  1.408**  0.392**  0.418**  0.493** 
  (0.289)  (0.339)  (0.125)  (0.156)  (0.060) 
Cohabitation  0.604*  1.052**  0.127  0.536**  0.304** 
  (0.296)  (0.272)  (0.155)  (0.107)  (0.052) 
Constant -6.426** -5.714** -6.856** -4.393** -4.381** -3.376** -5.129** -3.972** -3.018** -1.357** 
 (0.377) (0.601) (0.437) (0.734) (0.247) (0.429) (0.228) (0.369) (0.093) (0.167) 
Events 212 212 141 141 344 344 472 472 2166 2166 
Person-years 40416 40416 32629 32629 17254 17254 35207 35207 60289 60289 
Log-likelihood -1314.89 -1307.43 -891.36 -868.16 -1674.65 -1665.70 -2472.20 -2449.53 -9241.97 -9116.05 
Chi-square 19.28 34.19 33.94 80.33 25.42 43.32 63.79 109.13 178.69 430.53 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
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Table 3. Does the educational gradient change across time? Comparing models with and without interactions between education and marriage 
cohort. 
 Model A  Model A + 
edu*yearmar 
 χ² / df 
Difference 
Middle 
education 
(ref: low) 
High 
education 
(ref: low) 
Year of 
marriage 
Middle * 
year of 
marriage 
High * 
year of 
marriage 
 χ² df χ² df       
Austria 121.53 6 123.72 8 2.19 / 2 -0.460† -0.201* 0.036** 0.013 -0.004 
Flanders 54.42 6 65.26 8 10.84 / 2 ** 0.247 1.050* 0.067** -0.034 -0.138* 
Estonia 27.81 6 28.62 8 0.81 / 2 0.053 0.452 -0.008 -0.012 -0.032 
Finland 40.44 6 49.25 8 8.81 / 2 * 0.438† 0.682† 0.054** -0.034* -0.054* 
France 207.23 6 212.78 8 5.55 / 2 † 0.598** 0.679* 0.103** -0.026* -0.033† 
Germany 55.65 6 57.13 8 1.48 / 2  -0.013 0.376 0.085** -0.007 -0.071 
Greece 18.38 6 20.35 8 1.97 / 2 -0.359 0.635 -0.030 0.049 0.010 
Hungary 14.77 6 22.56 8 7.79 / 2 * 0.359 0.642† 0.038** -0.045* -0.072* 
Italy 54.31 6 59.90 8 5.59 / 2 † 0.769† 2.288** 0.080** -0.023 -0.092* 
Latvia 39.79 6 41.51 8 1.72 / 2 0.076 0.289 0.031 -0.016 -0.032 
Lithuania 60.06 6 66.88 8 6.82 / 2 * -0.191 -0.808† 0.048† -0.027 0.017 
Norway 24.94 5 27.14 7 2.20 / 2 0.377 0.253 0.064** -0.039 -0.018 
Poland 19.28 6 32.70 8 13.42 / 2 ** 1.757** 2.195** 0.074** -0.071** -0.090** 
Spain 33.94 6 36.61 8 2.73 / 2 0.654 1.628* 0.059** 0.007 -0.068 
Sweden 25.42 6 39.47 8  14.05 / 2 ** 0.579† 1.033** 0.065** -0.057* -0.096** 
Switzerland 63.79 6 64.77 8 0.98 / 2  -0.319 0.219 0.010 0.009 -0.011 
USA 178.69 6 196.67 8 17.98 / 2 ** -0.280* -0.019 0.012 0.000 -0.030** 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
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Table 4: Results from multi-level discrete-time event history models with each macro variable introduced separately. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 No macro-
variables 
Divorce laws Social policies Values Family 
practices 
Modernity and the labour market 
Micro & Macro 
variables 
A: Equation 
with micro 
variables 
only  
B: A & divorce laws (no & 
strict divorce as reference 
category) 
C: A & 
social 
expenditure 
/ GDP 
D: A & 
Family 
cash 
benefits / 
GDP 
E: A & % 
atheists or 
non-
religious 
F: A & % 
‘divorce 
justifiable’ 
G: A & 
unconventio
nal family 
types 
H: A & 
degree 
urbanization 
(%) 
I: A & 
Employment 
in services 
(%) 
J: A & 
economically 
active women 
(%) 
  Less strict, 
more 
individual 
Pure 
unilateral 
divorce 
        
Middle education 
level 
1.354** 
(0.281) 
1.345** 
(0.291) 
1.107** 
(0.284) 
1.195** 
(0.290) 
1.348** 
(0.292) 
1.245** 
(0.325) 
1.256** 
(0.296) 
1.410** 
(0.311) 
1.461** 
(0.292) 
2.069** 
(0.311) 
High education 
level 
2.726** 
(0.364) 
2.548** 
(0.381) 
2.351** 
(0.374) 
2.587** 
(0.378) 
2.688** 
(0.380) 
2.556** 
(0.421) 
2.579** 
(0.375) 
3.201** 
(0.398) 
2.921** 
(0.369) 
3.536** 
(0.394) 
Year of marriage 0.041** 
(0.003) 
0.036** 
(0.003) 
0.032** 
(0.003) 
0.039** 
(0.003) 
0.040** 
(0.003) 
0.038** 
(0.003) 
0.029** 
(0.004) 
0.041** 
(0.003) 
0.034** 
(0.004) 
0.044** 
(0.003) 
Duration 0.059** 
(0.006) 
0.058** 
(0.007) 
0.054** 
(0.007) 
0.062** 
(0.007) 
0.062** 
(0.007) 
0.059** 
(0.007) 
0.056** 
(0.007) 
0.064** 
(0.007) 
0.059** 
(0.007) 
0.067** 
(0.007) 
Duration2  -0.002** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
Parental divorce 0.509** 
(0.006) 
0.504** 
(0.039) 
0.504** 
(0.007) 
0.602** 
(0.007) 
0.502** 
(0.039) 
0.509** 
(0.007) 
0.506** 
(0.007) 
0.500 
(0.038) 
0.509 
(0.007) 
0.499** 
(0.039) 
Middle* year of 
marriage 
-0.019** 
(0.004) 
-0.016** 
(0.004) 
-0.019** 
(0.004) 
-0.018** 
(0.004) 
-0.018** 
(0.004) 
-0.018** 
(0.004) 
-0.013** 
(0.004) 
-0.018** 
(0.004) 
-0.014** 
(0.004) 
-0.018** 
(0.004) 
High*year of 
marriage 
-0.037** 
(0.005) 
-0.035** 
(0.005) 
-0.036** 
(0.005) 
-0.036** 
(0.005) 
-0.037** 
(0.005) 
-0.036** 
(0.005) 
-0.028** 
(0.005) 
-0.035** 
(0.005) 
-0.030** 
(0.005) 
-0.035** 
(0.005) 
Main effect macro 
variable 
 0.467** 
(0.072) 
0.525** 
(0.173) 
0.024** 
(0.007) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.009† 
(0.005) 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
0.012* 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
Middle*macro 
variable 
 -0.165† 
(0.100) 
-0.136 
(0.171) 
0.015* 
(0.006) 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.013** 
(0.002) 
High*macro 
variable 
 0.015 
(0.137) 
0.039 
(0.201) 
0.017** 
(.006) 
0.007† 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.013** 
(0.003) 
-0.016** 
(0.003) 
Variance at 
country level 
0.341 
(0.121) 
0.327 
(0.116) 
0.453 
(0.161) 
0.340 
(0.121) 
0.315 
(0.112) 
0.345 
(0.123) 
0.272 
(0.097) 
0.368 
(0.131) 
0.330 
(0.118) 
0.387 
(0.138) 
-2 log likelihood -671411 -683712 -651732 -673596 -679952 -672354 -703343 -663827 -680544 -657024 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
 
Table 5 : Results from multi-level discrete-time event history models with various combinations of 
the significant macro-variables and their interactions with high and middle education. Standard 
errors in parentheses.  
 K: A &  
three main 
effects of 
macro-
variables  
L: Unconv. 
family & 
female 
economic 
activity 
M: Social 
expenditure 
& unconv. 
family 
N: Social 
expenditure & 
female 
economic 
activity 
Middle education level 1.293** 
(0.262) 
1.568**  
(0.347) 
1.028** 
(0.290) 
1.783** 
(0.303) 
High education level 2.467** 
(0.348) 
2.769** 
(0.430) 
2.248** 
(0.375) 
3.070** 
(0.392) 
Year of marriage 0.034** 
(0.004) 
0.032** 
(0.004) 
0.027** 
(0.004) 
0.035** 
(0.003) 
Duration 0.059** 
(0.007) 
0.059** 
(0.007) 
0.056** 
(0.007) 
0.061** 
(0.006) 
Duration
2
 -0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.000) 
Parental divorce 0.512** 
(0.039) 
0.508** 
(0.039) 
0.509** 
(0.039) 
0.501** 
(0.038) 
Middle* year of marriage -0.018** 
(0.003) 
-0.014** 
(0.003) 
-0.014** 
(0.003) 
-0.018** 
(0.003) 
High*year of marriage -0.034** 
(0.004) 
-0.029** 
(0.005) 
-0.028** 
(0.005) 
-0.034** 
(0.005) 
Social expenditure % GDP 0.042** 
(0.006) 
 0.025** 
(0.007) 
0.032** 
(0.007) 
% women economically active -0.017** 
(0.004) 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
 -0.008* 
(0.004) 
Unconventional family types 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.006** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
 
% women economically active* Middle education level  -0.005† 
(0.003) 
 -0.011** 
(0.002) 
Unconventional family types * Middle education level  -0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
 
Social expenditure * Middle education level   0.015* 
(0.006) 
0.012* 
(0.005) 
% women economically active* High education level  -0.004 
(0.004) 
 -0.008* 
(0.004) 
Unconventional family types * High education level  -0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
 
Social expenditure * High education level   0.015* 
(0.006) 
0.013* 
(0.006) 
Variance at country level 0.596 
(0.212) 
0.308 
(0.11) 
0.453 
(0.161) 
0.602 
(0.214) 
-2 log likelihood -604966 -686594 -655527 -611774 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
 
 
